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Abstract
Performing deep learning on end-user devices provides fast
offline inference results and can help protect the user’s pri-
vacy. However, running models on untrusted client devices
reveals model information which may be proprietary, i.e., the
operating system or other applications on end-user devices
may be manipulated to copy and redistribute this informa-
tion, infringing on the model provider’s intellectual property.
We propose the use of ARM TrustZone, a hardware-based
security feature present in most phones, to confidentially
run a proprietary model on an untrusted end-user device.
We explore the limitations and design challenges of using
TrustZone and examine potential approaches for confiden-
tial deep learning within this environment. Of particular
interest is providing robust protection of proprietary model
information while minimizing total performance overhead.
CCSConcepts • Security andprivacy→Hardware-based
security protocols; •Computingmethodologies→Neu-
ral networks.
Keywords ARM TrustZone, Hardware Security, Convolu-
tional Neural Networks
1 Introduction
Mobile devices have traditionally adopted a client-server
paradigm for deep-learning-based inference, wherein the
performance of the system is heavily contingent on the net-
work conditions . For example, inference requests might
require the frequent transfer of relatively large quantities
of data from the mobile device to the cloud server hosting
the Deep Neural Network (DNN) model—such is the case for
speech or image recognition. In the worst case, when the
device lacks an internet connection entirely, the user cannot
benefit from these inference services at all. One promising
solution to these network problems is to execute the DNN
models directly on the user’s device.
However, model execution on end-user devices presents
its own novel challenges for the model providers. In this
work, we focus on one such challenge, namely, maintaining
the confidentiality of a proprietary model running on an un-
trusted end-user device. In general, a model may be considered
intellectual property when it adopts a custom architecture
or when it was trained using proprietary data. As users may
have full access to the hardware and software of their de-
vices, the client operating system or other applications may
be manipulated to copy and redistribute proprietary models,
infringing on the model provider’s intellectual property. We
refer to this as the confidential deep learning problem.
In this paper, we demonstrate how a Trusted Execution En-
vironment (TEE) can serve as the foundation for confidential
deep learning on untrusted devices. Both x86 and ARM ar-
chitectures already provide hardware mechanisms that sup-
port trusted execution environments. These mechanisms—
SGX on x86 [7] and TrustZone on ARM [3]—are widely de-
ployed but rarely used by applications. While the technical
details vary between architecture and TEE implementation,
TEEs typically provide three fundamental capabilities that
providers can leverage to keep models confidential. First,
TEEs provide an isolated environment for code execution
that cannot be manipulated by other software running on
the device, including the untrusted operating system. Sec-
ond, TEEs allow for a model provider to remotely guarantee
the integrity of the code loaded into the TEE via remote
attestation. Third, TEEs provide mechanisms to ensure that
data used inside of the environment cannot be read or ma-
nipulated externally and that the data never leaves the TEE
without being encrypted.
However, a number of significant research challenges pre-
vent model providers from simply porting existing DNN
inference code. First, operations performed in a trusted exe-
cution environment typically run orders of magnitude slower
than if the same operations were performed in the untrusted
environment [14]. Similarly, the TEE does not provide code
with the same abstractions (e.g., system calls, dynamic thread-
ing) or capabilities (e.g., memory is limited and page swap-
ping is expensive) as normal code. Consequently, the infer-
ence code, and perhaps the models as well, must be heavily
modified to run within the TEE. In short, both the perfor-
mance and engineering costs are high.
We explore the performance tradeoffs and design chal-
lenges of confidential deep learning in trusted execution
environments. We focus exclusively on ARM devices, as
ARM is the dominant architecture for end-user devices such
as mobile phones. To provide a realistic context, we consider
existing hardware, TrustZone [3]; an existing TEE implemen-
tation, OP-TEE [6]; and an existing inference framework,
DarkNet [10].
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2 Background
2.1 ARM TrustZone
ARM TrustZone is a hardware security module present in
most mobile phones [3]. The core principle of TrustZone is
the isolation of secure and non-secure operations. To achieve
this, TrustZone implements two independent execution en-
vironments, called the Secure world and Normal world, that
run simultaneously on the same processor core. TrustZone
divides physical memory and peripherals between these two
worlds such that processes executing in the Normal world
are only able to access a subset of memory and peripherals.
It also provides mechanisms to securely context switch be-
tween the worlds. As the phone’s operating system is placed
in the Normal world, TrustZone can be used as the founda-
tion for a trusted execution environment.
2.2 Trusted Execution Environments
A trusted execution environment (TEE) is an isolated envi-
ronment that runs in parallel with the Normal world OS.
TEE implementations range from simple libraries to full OS
kernels and while the exact capabilities vary, a TEE imple-
mentation must guarantee the confidentiality and integrity
of the code and data located inside the TEE. In this paper,
we focus on OP-TEE, a trusted execution environment built
on TrustZone that follows the GlobalPlatform standards [6].
Under OP-TEE, trusted applications run in the Secureworld
(i.e., the trusted execution environment), protected by use of
TrustZone-provided isolation and managed by an OP-TEE
kernel. This kernel, which also runs in the Secure world,
provides useful APIs to trusted applications and performs
all interactions with the Normal world. As the kernel is de-
signed to be lightweight, it relies on the Normal world OS
for various operations, including most system calls, process
scheduling, and reading files from storage. Each trusted ap-
plication is signed with a private pre-generated 2048-bit RSA
key which can be placed in a separate hardware security
module to provide code signing. OP-TEE will not execute
trusted applications that fail the integrity check.
Trusted applications, in essence, act as services that are
called by client applications running in the Normal world
under the normal operating system. A context connects the
client application to the TEE, then a session connects the
client application to a specific trusted application inside the
TEE. Once a session is established, the client application
opens a communication channel to the trusted application.
Data is passed between the client and trusted applications
through the use of shared memory buffers, these are regions
of memory allocated in the Normal world by the untrusted
OS which are then registered with OP-TEE and mapped into
the memory space of the trusted application. This allows
large amounts of data to be passed into and out of the secure
world, but this memory is not secure and therefore cannot
be trusted to hold unencrypted confidential information.
Lastly, the specific security guarantees of OP-TEE depend
on the exact hardware of the device. For example, though
officially supported by OP-TEE, the Raspberry Pi 3 Model B
supports some TrustZone operations but lacks the TrustZone
Address Space Controller, which is the peripheral responsi-
ble for partitioning the Normal and Secure world memory.
Further, the Raspberry Pi 3 also lacks the hardware modules
needed to securely store keys for code signing.
2.3 Convolutional Neural Networks
We focus our initial efforts on a popular type of DNN called
convolutional neural networks (CNNs). CNNs are feedforward
neural networks that contain neurons that are organized in
layers. CNNs only require each layer to be processed during
inference, unlike recurrent neural networks that might re-
quire accessing the same layer multiple times, making CNNs
good candidates for understanding the fundamental chal-
lenges of deep learning in trusted execution environments.
The process of using a pre-trained CNN model to perform
image classification is referred to as inference or the forward
pass. A pre-trained CNN consists of at least one input and
one output layer, as well as a number of hidden layers. The
total number of layers in a CNN is often referred to as the
depth of the network—hence deep neural networks. In the
case of image classification, the input layer is initialized as a
single vector using raw image pixel values and the output
layer is a vector corresponding to the likelihood of each
potential classification label. Each hidden layer in-between
consists of neurons that typically consist of a weight vector
and a bias, both learned during training. For each neuron, we
calculate an output value using the outputs of the previous
layer; specifically, we compute the dot product between the
neuron’s input vector and its weight vector and then offset by
a bias. The input vector is a subset of the neuron outputs from
the previous layer as defined by the connections between
the layers. In essence, one can think of the forward pass of
each layer in terms of matrix multiplication.
3 Problem Definition and Threat Model
A pre-trained CNN model may be considered intellectual
property, or proprietary, when it adopts a custom architecture—
e.g., the number/type of layers and connections between
them—or when the model was trained using proprietary
data. Our objective is a TEE architecture that guarantees the
confidentiality of a proprietary deep learning model—e.g.,
weights, structure—even when that model is running on a
device controlled by an untrusted user. In our threat model,
we assume the untrusted user has control over the device’s
operating system as well as total access to the device’s mem-
ory and storage. However, we also assume the presence of a
trusted execution environment loaded into the Secure World,
e.g., OP-TEE. We discuss the challenges of using such an
environment for deep learning in Section 4. The untrusted
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client may attempt to leak proprietary model information,
and we assume that they will succeed if that data is ever
stored unencrypted in memory or storage accessible by the
untrusted Normal world operating system.
We consider that the model originates from a software
developer as part of an application installed into local storage
accessible to the untrusted OS and that the developer intends
to keep this model confidential from the untrusted user. We
assume existing mechanisms in the TEE will prevent the
loading of the developer’s application if it has beenmodified—
indeed, such functionality is already implemented in OP-TEE
and was discussed previously. However, the untrusted user
may attempt to manipulate software running in the TEE by
manipulating the execution or responses of normal world
system calls made by the TEE, i.e., Iago attacks [2]. Further,
the user may try to load malicious applications into the
TEE. The inclusion of malicious trusted applications is a
significant threat as users will want to download and install
third party applications, whichmay come from compromised
or malicious vendors.
In our analysis we do not consider hardware attacks, side-
channel attacks such as execution timing, or direct modi-
fication of the trusted execution environment before boot.
We also exclude application signing and distribution. No
defense is provided against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks
on trusted applications. Similarly, no protection is provided
against trusted applications revealing their own data inten-
tionally or through leaks in their public APIs.
4 Model Partitioning to Support
Confidential Deep Learning
Below we walk through the design of a hypothetical frame-
work for confidential deep learning on untrusted devices. For
this exercise, we assume a device with TrustZone support
using OP-TEE to provide the trusted execution environment.
4.1 Motivation
Imagine a theoretical machine learning framework tasked
with performing inference given an input (e.g., an image)
and a pre-trained convolutional neural network (CNN). Let
us assume that the model is already present on the device—
saved to a file (or set of files) on disk—and will be loaded
by the framework as part of the inference process. Further,
let’s assume that all inference calculations are done directly
on the CPU, i.e., the system does not have a GPU or other
hardware accelerator that can be used for inference tasks.
To perform inference using CNNs, our framework needs to
calculate the activation of many individual artificial neurons.
To determine any given neuron’s activation, we need three
things: the activation (a) of all the nodes connected to it, a
weight (w) for each connected node, and a bias (b) for the
given neuron. The neuron’s output activation is a weighted
sum of the input neuron activations and the bias valuew1a1+
w2a2+ ...+wnan +b. In a fully connected layer, every neuron
will depend on the same set of previous activations, but will
have a unique sets of weights and a unique bias.
In conventional CNN execution, i.e., when memory is
abundant and confidentiality is not a concern, the weights
and bias for every neuron in a network are all pre-loaded
into memory prior to neuron activation calculations. This
pre-loading enables neuron calculations to be performed
efficiently using matrix multiplication, which is highly opti-
mized in modern CPUs. Additionally, hardware accelerators
such as GPUs allow many neurons in a given layer to be
computed simultaneously.
However, memory is not abundant inside of the trusted
execution environment and pre-loading all of these values
requires a substantial amount of memory. In the current
version of OP-TEE, the physical memory dedicated to the
secure world is statically configured at build time and trusted
applications are limited to roughly 7MB of secureworldmem-
ory. Compare this limit to the hundreds of MBs required to
execute common CNN models—even MobileNet-v2 which
targets mobile device requires 630 MB of memory [1]. While
redesigning OP-TEE to provide additional secure world mem-
ory is likely possible—-for example, by modifying both op-
erating systems to dynamically reallocate memory between
worlds—the engineering challenges of implementing such
an approach lead us to consider alternative solutions.
One way to counteract this memory limitation is to divide
the neural network into partitions. Each partition would
have its own weights file containing all the weights and
biases for the neurons associated with that partition. By
executing each partition separately, the entire model could
be computed in pieces. If the partitions are selected to be
sufficiently small, then the information necessary at runtime
should be small enough to fit in the limited secure world
memory. In the following sections we detail three potential
methods to perform such partitioning along with the design
constraints that motivate them.
4.2 Layer-Based Partitioning
The simplest and most straightforward way to partition a
CNN is to break it up by layer. As each layer depends only
on the output of the previous layer, these divides act as
natural partitions within existing network architectures. In
this approach, each layer would be an independent partition
as shown in Figure 1a with its own set of weights and biases
stored in a separate encrypted file. The encrypted file for
one partition would be loaded into shared memory and then
decrypted by the trusted application into secure memory. For
the first partition, input data would be passed in from shared
memory and the layer would be executed to compute the
activation of all the neurons it contains. Once complete, the
weights and biases of the current layer could be discarded
and replaced with the appropriate values for the next layer.
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The current neuron activations would be stored in Secure
world memory for use as inputs to the next layer.
This partitioning method is beneficial as the only values
needed at a given time are the activations of the previous
layer and the weights and biases for the current layer. This
effectively limits the instantaneous memory footprint to that
of a single layer, with the largest layer in the model determin-
ing the minimum amount of Secure world memory needed.
For two fully connected layers each of n neurons, this would
be n activation values, n biases, and n2 weights. However, if
a single layer within a model has many neurons, it may still
require a substantial amount of memory. While this may not
occur for simple models, such as the MNIST LeNet classi-
fier, we believe that many commonly used models such as
MobileNet will encounter this issue due to their larger size.
Overcoming this challenge requires further partitioning the
model into smaller subsets.
4.3 Sub-Layer Partitioning
In layer-based partitioning, if any individual layer proves
too large to run entirely within the Secure world, then the
model will fail to execute. This limits the size of each layer
to the size of the available memory and would require model
redesign to reduce the number of neurons in each layer,
potentially impacting model accuracy.
To avoid redesigning the model, we propose sub-layer
partitioning. In this method the model is first partitioned by
layer, and then further divided into p subsets of s neurons
where 1 < s ≤ p, this is shown in Figure 1b with p =
s = 2. For two fully connected layers each of n neurons; n
activations, sxn weights, and s biases would be needed at
any given time. This method allows for a variable memory
footprint simply by adjusting the size of the subset given by
s . At minimum with s = 1, the model would be executed one
neuron at a time with only the previous n activations, one set
of n weights, and one bias value being required at any given
time. This would likely reduce the needed memory by an
order of magnitude from simple layer based partitioning as
s could be selected to be much smaller than n, with memory
complexity growing as factor of sxn rather than n2. Note this
also means that we cannot compute the values of all neurons
belonging to a layer at once using matrix multiplication,
leading to slower execution.
For sub-layer partitioning, the defining characteristic of
memory size is the number of activations and weights that
need to be stored from the previous layer. While the current
layer can easily be divided into small subsets, each of those
subsets will still require the full n activations of the previous
layer. Should this require more memory than is available in
the Secure world, some of these activation values may need
to be swapped into shared memory as they are computed.
These intermediate activation values represent proprietary
model information and would need to be encrypted before
being moved into shared memory. Unfortunately, this means
that during the execution of one subset of neurons, activation
values would need to be loaded from shared memory and
decrypted into secure memory. This process would have to
be repeated until all activation values were accessed, mean-
ing that the execution of each subset would require several
costly decryption calls. Worse yet, these values would need
to be cleared from memory to make room for the remaining
activation values,so every subset would have to re-decrypt
the same information.
4.4 Branched-Execution Partitioning
To reduce the number of weights and activations required,
and therefore reduce the instantaneous memory footprint,
we propose the use of branched execution partitioning [11].
This method essentially splits the later layers of CNNs into
multiple mutually independent branches, as shown in Fig-
ure 1c. This reduces the number of intermediate activation
values and weights that would need to be stored in Secure
memory as the neurons of each branch depend only upon a
portion of the neurons in the previous layer.
In this topology each branch is able to learn different fea-
tures, and previous work suggests the higher-level features
extracted in the later layers of a CNN tend to contain more
significant information about the underlying training data
than the earlier layers [8]. As such, one promising solution is
to use a partially-branchedmodel with the early, unbranched,
layers running in the Normal world and the later, branched,
layers running in the Secure world.
Partial-branching is especially beneficial from the perspec-
tive of memory usage as it is common in CNNs for the early
layers to contain the largest, highest dimensional data. Exe-
cuting the largest layers in the Normal world will allow us
to make use of abundant memory. The extracted features,
which typically have much smaller dimensionality than the
input data, can be passed into the Secure world to continue
execution. In the Secure world, the branched nature of the
model will allow for sub-layer partitioning to be applied with
a minimal number of activations and weights needed at any
given time. This should allow activation values to be stored
in memory and prevent the large encryption and decryption
overhead otherwise required.
4.5 Summary
The limited available memory of trusted execution environ-
ments heavily constrains the design of confidential deep
learning frameworks. While model partitioning is a promis-
ing mechanism to address these memory challenges, design-
ing performant partitioning schema is non-trivial and heavily
influenced by the structure of the underlying model.
We believe that the three partitioningmethods we propose
are applicable under different use cases. For small models,
layer based partitioning seems promising due to its simplic-
ity and ability to run models without any modification to
their structures. For moderate-sized models, or models on
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(a) Layer-Based Partitioning (b) Sub-Layer Partitioning (c) Branched Partitioning
Figure 1. Proposed Partition Schema for CNNs to Support Confidential Deep Learning
platforms where memory limitations are critical, sub-layer
partitioning extends layer based partitioning to further re-
duce memory usage. However, as the size of layer outputs
approaches the available memory size, we risk significant
performance overhead. If model performance is paramount,
branched-execution partitioning has the potential to greatly
decrease runtime, particularly for large models, while still
providing confidentiality given a tradeoff of additional de-
velopment time.
5 Overhead of Layer-Based Partitioning
In this section, we briefly investigate the performance over-
head introduced by layer-based partitioning—the simplest
method we propose. We identify two factors that are likely to
have the largest impact on performance: model decryption
and context switching.
We selected the Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, a hardware
platform that supports ARM TrustZone and implemented
the hardware and software components relevant to context
switching and encryption on top of OP-TEE 3.5.0. We used
DarkNet [10], an open source neural network library, to
collect the baseline for CNN inference in the Normal world.
When execution moves from the Normal world to the Se-
cure world (or vise versa), the hardware performs a context
switch, clearing the current program state and resuming ex-
ecution in the other world. This process requires resetting
registers, switching cache content, and clearing the execu-
tion pipeline [3]. However, this overhead is only part of the
total cost, as each transition between a client application and
a trusted application adds additional overhead in the form
of OP-TEE library code and OP-TEE secure OS operations.
Using an instrumented client application, we measured an
average context switch time of 75.1 microseconds.
As files are distributed in an encrypted form they are pro-
tected from disclosure, but must be decrypted in the Secure
world before use. To estimate decryption overhead, we first
measured the time to decrypt chunks of memory of vari-
ous sizes in a trusted application, finding an average cost of
163.7 nanoseconds per block.
Using DarkNet in the Normal world and the MNIST LeNet
model, we measured an average inference time of 8.23 mil-
liseconds. With this baseline and the costs of a context
switch tcs and of decrypting a block td , we estimate the
overhead of layer-based partitioning as follows. The num-
ber of context switches depends on the number of layers
in the model. In this case, LetNet has a total of 11 layers.
The amount of information to be decrypted depends on the
model storage size. For the LeNet model, the weights file con-
tains 191,124 bytes and an additional 666 is needed for the
model configuration file, yielding a total of 191,790 bytes that
need to be decrypted. Hence, the additional execution time
added by layer-based partitioning is tcs ∗11∗2+ td ∗191, 790,
which comes out to be 33.05ms. Thus, even for simple models
such as LeNet, we are looking at an overhead of 4X. This
suggests the importance of considering context switching
and decryption during both framework and model design.
6 Related Work
For context on trusted execution, we can look to nascent
research that focuses on using trusted execution environ-
ments, but in a cloud server setting. Tramer and Boneh found
a provider that can achieve lower overhead when partition-
ing code if the primary goal is to ensure code integrity rather
than preserve the privacy of user information [14]. This ob-
servation naturally applies to the end-device scenario we
are investigating, as user data remains private (without TEE
protections) if it never leaves the user’s device. Yet, the work
of Tramer and Boneh also leaves many open questions. For
instance, their work does not consider how to train the mod-
els in the TEE, instead focusing solely on inferences. Further,
their work does not hide the model parameters from the un-
trusted OS and thus proprietary model data could be leaked.
Lastly, their framework was designed to work with Intel SGX
rather than ARM TrustZone and thus needs to be adapted
for end-user devices.
Fan and Haddadi extended the use of trusted execution
environments to develop DarkNetP, an application for run-
ning DarkNet networks in ARM TrustZone [8]. The focus
of this work is on protecting the privacy of data used to
train neural networks by containing intermediate values of
the model within a TEE. As such, the authors provide an
interesting exploration of differential privacy techniques and
explore how CNNs store information about training data [8].
This differs from our goal of ensuring the confidentiality of
DNN models and therefore Fan and Haddadi do not address
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the challenges of proprietary information contained within
model files nor the memory limitations of TEEs.
Given increasingly large DNN models and the need to ex-
ecute inference on resource constrained devices, researchers
have proposed model parallelism [5] to speed up training
and layer-based partitioning [4, 8, 11, 12] to speed up infer-
ence. Similarly, our formulation of layer-based partitioning
is a more generalized form of the DarkNetP approach [8].
The DarkNetP authors divide models into only two parti-
tions, one which runs in the Normal world and one which
runs in the Secure world. Our formulation expands this con-
cept to treat each individual layer as a partition with the
ability to run arbitrary partitions in the Secure world. The
use of branched execution partitioning is derived from the
work of Sutton et al. [11]. In this paper, the authors propose
the use of hidden layers which are not fully connected in
order to increase the learning speed. They found that mod-
els of this topology outperform fully-partitioned and fully-
unpartitioned networks even on real-world vision tasks.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
We characterized the confidential deep learning problem and
identified the challenges of using ARM TrustZone to exe-
cute deep learning models on untrusted end-user devices.
We sketched out three potential solutions for partitioning
models to address the inherent problems of limited secure
memory in trusted execution environments. While we have
yet to fully explore model partitioning, there are a number of
orthogonal research challenges that must also be addressed
before confidential deep learning can be deployed to a pro-
duction environment. We discuss just a few below.
One challenge is establishing a root of trust. In our testing
environment, no protection is provided against malicious
modifications to the OP-TEE Secure world OS while it is in
storage. To prevent such attacks, a hardware root of trust,
perhaps using a Trusted Platform Module, would need to be
leveraged as part of a trusted boot sequence. Trusted boot is
achievable on modern smartphones, but it requires collabora-
tion with the phone manufacturer. Additionally, a method of
key distribution and management would need to be devised
to protect the confidentiality of the deep learning model.
Model providers will need to distribute their models in an
encrypted form, likely using a secret key that is unique for
every device-model pair to prevent one key disclosure from
comprising every model on every device. Further, to verify
the integrity of the trusted application a form of remote at-
testation would need to be implemented, i.e., guaranteeing
to the model provider that the trusted application has not
been modified and the model can be decrypted safely.
Another important challenge is preventing side-channel
leakage. There are known side-channel attacks for leaking
private information from TEEs. Such attacks rely on execu-
tion behavior that is both observable by the attacker and
dependent on private data, e.g., memory access patterns, ex-
ecution time, storage access patterns, and network accesses.
The most promising defense against these attacks is to de-
sign and implement algorithms whose executions are data
oblivious, e.g., memory access patterns do not depend on
private data [9]. The extent to which model partitioning op-
erations are vulnerable to these side-channels and how to
best protect them is an important question that we plan to
investigate. Fortunately, there has been some recent work in
this area; Tople et al. recently detailed a side-channel against
DNNs on cloud servers using SGX that can infer encrypted
inputs to the model. However, their proposed defense is not a
complete solution for our problem as it doesn’t protect other
aspects of the model from leaking (e.g., the weights) [13].
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